I could see it coming
Every accident, such as the horrific collapse of the highway bridge in Minneapolis, brings on six, predictable steps:
1) Shock – People react to devastation in a visceral way. For a fair percentage of people, the instant response is “OMG,” “Wow,” or even “Cool.” It may take several beats, minutes, or hours before even those of us who exhibit a great deal of empathy in our personal and professional lives finally arrive at a genuine sense of dread about the matter. Just before that moment sets in is where local news is at its best, satisfying what is at this point an insatiable curiosity.
2) Grief – First from those directly affected, then from the rest of us witnessing them, in widening circles. Here, the news process rapidly goes downhill, chasing the “human story” in the form of cameras and mikes in the faces of the distraught, preferably as they are dragged from the river. It’s not the media display of individual grief that is so unwholesome as much as the competition to display it sooner, oftener, and more graphically as the media swarm descends on the situation.
3) Political outrage – They can’t help it. Politicians trade on outrage. Unlike the media coverage of grief, which only gets unseemly when it balloons into a competition of pain, political outrage is unseemly at the outset. Then, the competition begins. That escalating outrage is conveniently directed at the most politically vulnerable link in the chain of causation (or foreigners). Not to underestimate the depth of outrage a politician is capable of mustering, politicians can express it toward several politically vulnerable groups, opponents, and each other all at once. They’re that good.
4) Blame – Any situation where people get hurt on a large scale, no matter how accidental, sooner or later generates a widespread sense that “someone” is at fault. In the case of engineering failure, there is almost never a single reason. Given how few bridges collapse in this country, the most likely cause is a whole chain of improbable decisions and events that, absent any other intervention, would be unlikely to recur in several decades. But the politicians will lead the hunt, with the media close behind, instinctively homing in one of several links in that chain as “the” cause.
5) The Memo – In the witch hunt that follows, eventually proof will show up that someone, somewhere, wrote a memo predicting that this would happen. Sort of. It will rarely be a definitive prediction, such as “Structural defect A will lead this bridge to fail in the next six-to-twelve months if we don’t do anything.” It will be a more general prediction like, “Deficiency A across our system of bridges may, if untreated, eventually lead to severe problems, or even catastrophic results.” This memo will, of course, be indistinguishable from thousands of similar memos that predict disasters of indeterminate timing and consequence all over the nation all the time. But as far as the blame hunters are concerned, here is the smoking gun. Every can see the smoke with the perfect clarity of hindsight bias.
6) Prosecution – The person who ignored “the memo” becomes a useful scapegoat. And his boss. And their co-conspirators. The eventual trial is, of course, just another part of the show that this whole disaster becomes, the crescendo of blame and outrage, a chance for the people to march from the countryside with their torches through the public square…oh, wait, wrong century.
Not.
You’d like to think that a disaster, unfortunate as it is, can be used as a learning opportunity. If we never have an engineering failure, then things clearly have been over-engineered. After a failure, if the process is done right, everyone has the incentive to contribute information related to the chain of events so that resources can be focused on the weakest link.
Blame and outrage destroys that process. It forces everyone associated with the accident to hide the very information most closely related to the weakest link. At its worst, when bad judgment criminalized, the only people benefiting are those doing the punishing. The rest of society bears the cost of overreaction.
Anyway, that’s the prediction here about how this accident will evolve into tragedy.
Michael Cassidy said,
Very cute and pat; and maybe true.
However, it still could be caused by corruption political and or corrupt maintenance by contractors. Also for a libertarian you never seem to comment about the erosion of our civil liberties. Maybe it wasn’t “bad” judgement but someone pocketing $100K or so and using faulty bolts; someone not inspecting but having a few beers instead.
Is it that as long as they let you play with your money they can take all your liberties away?
You remind me of all those 2d Admin. NRA men out there that hate the ACLU and its defense of the Bill of Rights forgetting that if they defended the other 9 Admins. the 2d would not be needed.
M. Hodak said,
Thanks for the comment, MC. I would consider someone using faulty bolts as bad judgment (or worse), but that’s unfortunately the kind of thing that would be prosecuted without regard to the context in which that judgment is made, with too little regard for the incentives and constraints under which that contractor was operating. The result of such prosecution would be more CYA bureaucracy and higher costs, and likely no improvement in the underlying causes of such mischief.
I believe that the media (and readers, perhaps) are too lazy to follow that thread to its logical end, or they don’t want to acknowledge an end that invariably points out the perils of “public” ownership.
Not sure where the second half of your comment is coming from. I think we share a revulsion of the erosion of liberties–all of them. I’m just trying to focus this blog on the economic dimension of group choices–a theme of “perverse incentives.” Lots of good bloggers are already focused on the moral aspect.
Michael Cassidy said,
The second half basically it came out because I was hoping to read your opinion.
Sorry you’re right the title of your blog is “Perverse incentives are endemic.”
Shakespeare's Fool said,
I prefer driving on “over-engineered” bridges. Particularly prefer “over-engineered” household wiring.
Which is perhaps why I appreciated my IBM model B typewriter more than the Selectrics I used that mis-typed.
True, I make plenty of typos, but the under-engineered Selectrics made some of their own.