Do you smell desperation?

Posted by Marc Hodak on August 17, 2007 under Economics | 3 Comments to Read

So, the Fed is watching the meltdown in our credit markets, feverishly pumping billions into the economy to keep the dollar in the target range of their arbitrarily chosen prime rate, and now deciding to cut its discount rate on bank loans. Does this sound like the sober, measured response of a technician adjusting some dials–the image of the Fed we have all been led to believe?

To me, it looks like my kids reaction when they placed marshmallows in the microwave. It was cool when they put in one, and it swelled up. Then they put two. Then four. Finally, as the marshmallow mass expanded out of control, they were feverishly trying to manage it with the “Start/Stop” button to prevent it from either deflating into a crisp cube of sugar, or blowing up in a big mess. The incentives were pretty weak on this trade-off, considering who would actually be cleaning up any mess.

The story machines we call our newspapers are labeling this the “sub-prime” mess. For months now, when the market has gone down, the headlines have been, “Markets Weighed Down by Sub-Prime Woes.” When markets went up, we’d read, “Markets Shrug Off Sub-prime Concerns.” It’s like the story-writer’s union has decided that this whole market is about “sub-prime,” and they created a serial based on that character to feed to AP, Reuters, etc.

For those of you who’d prefer financial news to financial entertainment, here’s the scoop: It’s not a “sub-prime” mess. It’s not even a sub-prime mess “spreading” to other markets. It’s a credit bubble that every banker and deal maker has seen slowly blowing up for the last four years. There was never any question in their minds about whether or not the thing would pop, only when and how bad. Well, when is now. How bad remains to be seen.

It never really mattered that the people over-borrowing were the folks in plaid shirts who couldn’t afford the home (or second home) they were trying to buy, or LBO artists in $5000 suits with those wonderful track records, i.e., somehow managing to make gobs of money by leveraging up during the recent bull market. All that mattered were that those loans were ultimately all based on one key thing–the underlying asset values would keep going up.

Now that they have stopped going up, people are all surprised. The first assets to get hit were the most vulnerable–low-end housing–so the economic geniuses in press are reporting that is where the problem “started.” (Have I complained enough about the lack of economic education among the press?) The problem of course started with the first marshmallows, in a world awash with sugar, blowing up nicely, and the kids trying the experiment getting a tasty treat.

Now, the Fedmeisters are standing in front a microwave that has been shoveled-pumped with marshmallows, and all they have is that “Start/Stop” switch to try to keep things puffed just the right amount. Good dad that I am, I’m putting on my gloves and getting out the cleaning fluids.

  • A Stitch in Haste said,

    The Federal Reserve — Statement of Principles

    Now is a good time to summarize my general thoughts on the Federal Reserve System.

    –A nat…

  • verc said,

    Pity there is no “Good Dad” to step in and clean up the Fed’s mess.

    Awesome Blog you have!

    I stumbled across you in a Bainbridge comment section.

    Do you know that on your main blog page there is no archive or comment section?
    http://www.hodakvalue.com/blog/

    I found that odd. It was only in one of your recent posts whereby you linked to another post that it became visible.
    Is this by design?

    Anyway, awesome blog and insights. I consider this a gem of a find.
    Do keep up the good work.

  • Methinks said,

    Marc,

    I’m not sure I agree with your whole analysis. Unfortunately, it lends itself nicely to financial engineering and more regulation. I can already sense the politicians drooling.

    The fact is, people were buying these CDOs (for which there is no liquid market, so they had to mark to model) and levering them 8 to 1. So, a 10% decline in the asset price means the fund blows up. That’s the kind of thing that happens when you are stupid enough to do that. Of course, this means margin calls and margin calls beget margin calls until everyone is delevered enough and the degenerate gamblers get what they asked for. It’s less sub-prime woes and more stupid leverage woes.

    The idea that home prices will continue to rise is beyond stupid. That I agree with.