Washington in New York: Better lucky than good

Posted by Marc Hodak on June 13, 2008 under History | 4 Comments to Read

I’m finally onto McCullough’s 1776. One of the great things about this book is that it looks at the Revolution from both sides, quoting liberally both British and American soldiers who left a record. This gives the reader a bit more complete sense of what was driving the events.

Of course, a historical book can’t win a Pulitzer if it doesn’t tell a story, and this one is no exception. Having just read about the Battle of Brooklyn as a story, with intent leading to action, even with unpredictable outcomes, simply reminded me of how chaotically history can actually unfold.

The Battle of Brooklyn was the first pitched battle of the American Revolution. It was almost the last. The more numerous, better trained, and better led British had every advantage, including the element of surprise. They nearly wiped out the nascent American army in a single morning.

Like most historians, McCullough blamed an inexperienced Washington for the disaster. The general’s indecision led to a split of his forces between Manhattan and Brooklyn rather than being concentrated in Brooklyn, which would have greatly improved their ability to resist the British. Washington also allowed the Jamaica Pass to stand virtually unguarded, which allowed the British to flank and surprise the Americans. As a result of these blunders, the American lines quickly collapsed and fell back to a fortified corner of Brooklyn against the East River. All that remained between the patriots and total destruction was an unfavorable wind that prevented British ships from sailing up the East River and surrounding them.

That’s when Washington decided to roll the dice on a risky, overnight evacuation of his army across the river to Manhattan. Unfortunately, the need for absolute silence trumped the need for speed. By dawn the Americans were still only half way done–it had taken most of the night just to gather vessels and position their equipment for the move. That particular morning, a fog completely enshrouded the Brooklyn side of the East River. Under cover of that fog, the Americans completed their evacuation. When they got to the other side, as the fog lifted, the patriots could see the redcoats scratching their heads.

McCullough says that there is nothing Washington could have done to forestall a loss in Brooklyn, and that it was by incredible good fortune, as well as a finely executed retreat, that his army survived. It’s hard to disagree with either statement. In hindsight, the best thing Washington could have done was to not bother trying to defend New York at all.

But given that the Continental Army was there–and it takes some hindsight bias to conclusively say that it shouldn’t have been there at all–what would have happened if Washington had been as good in battle as he was in retreat? What if he had been able to maneuver his troops expertly into position, and had plugged the Jamaica Pass as he had the other holes in his defense? In this one case, a better tactician would likely have been fatal to the cause of American independence.

With better positioning, the Americans could very well have held onto Brooklyn Heights that day. In fact, they could have held it until the wind changed, and the British sailed up the East River and begun their bombardment. By then, it would have been the whole American army, not just half of it, hopelessly surrounded. The miraculous fog would have come and gone without any consequence, since an evacuation would have been impossible.

In other words, while Washington could easily be blamed for the disaster at Brooklyn, America very well may have been fortunate that Washington succeeded in exactly the way he did, and failed in exactly the way he did. This episode could be viewed as the ultimate example of why it’s better to be lucky than good.