This
option mimics the EP treatment for self-constructed facilities (CIP).
Costs during the investment period are capitalized as a strategic
investment (SI) asset. At the end of each period, the SI asset is
increased by the cost of capital. For example, at the end of the month,
the SI asset in place at the beginning of the month is multiplied by the
monthly cost of capital, and that product is added to the SI asset.
Thus, the carrying cost of the SI asset becomes part of the SI asset.
The total SI asset
includes both "brick and mortar" from the investment plus the
"financing cost" of that investment. The entire SI asset is
then segregated from net assets in a capital suspense account so that it
does not get charged against EP. (As mentioned before, the capital
charge on the SI asset in the capital suspense account would be
capitalized into the SI asset).
Illustration
To illustrate this
adjustment, we provide the following example. A project requiring a $20
investment in Year 1 and an $8 additional investment in Year 2 will
generate zero income the first year and income that grows to $8 per year
by Year 5.<
This project creates value. Negative early year EP/EVA is more than covered by positive
EP after Year 3. If the $8 per year NOPAT persists into the future, the
NPV of this project is nearly $40. The problem, of course, is how to
disguise the $3.8 penalty of the first two years while preserving
accountability for all $28 invested. The Option 3 adjustment achieving
this trade off is illustrated as follows.
Here, we invest
$20 in Year 1, the year with no income. We should be charged $2 for that
investment. Our plan, however, is to place the whole SI asset into a
capital suspense account for the first two years. Thus in Year 1,
instead of taking the $2 capital charge against EP in the current
period, that charge is capitalized into the SI asset for Year 2. In Year
2, we invest another $8, but instead of a total SI asset being $28, we
now have a SI asset of $30. This includes the nominal $28 investment
plus the $2 carrying cost of the prior years $20 investment. Now,
Year 2 is also a year where the SI asset is in capital suspense, so we
capitalize that years SI asset charge of $3 as well. This will bring
the total SI asset up to $33.
Finally, in Year 3, the SI asset is not longer in the capital suspense account and EVA
includes the charge on the full SI asset, including the cumulative
capitalized charges from the early years (this example is simplified by
ignoring amortization). Thus, this example shows no negative EP in the
early years, but EP in later years bearing the full cost of the
investment.
Policies
A key to making
this treatment work is the discipline to bring the SI asset into the
business unit's capital base according to the schedule put forth in
the original project proposal, as approved. Delaying the onset of
capital with further capitalization of the capital charge is acceptable
only if that delay is also approved (as a separate project, so to
speak). Otherwise, managers should not have the discretion to
indefinitely put off "paying the bill."Managers should,
however, have the discretion to "pay early" by having project
capital come into the business unit capital base sooner than originally
projected.
Management may go one step further in adding discipline to this process by capitalizing
the planned capital charge (as opposed to the actual capital charge that
would arise from actual expenditures, which may differ from projected
costs). Any income variances from budget would create an EP impact on
the whole business unit, positive or negative depending on how the
project is managed. If the project was well designed and well executed,
variance from projections should be small enough to avoid any
significant effect on business unit EP.
Benefits
This treatment is
analogous to a credit card balance being allowed to grow as it rolls
forward instead of being paid down in the current billing cycle. It
leaves managers relatively EP neutral during the ramp-up phase. But it
also maintains accountability for the ultimate level of investment since
that investment and its timing will affect EP as the SI asset
eventually comes into business unit capital. If management over-invests,
business unit EP will be lower than otherwise it could be. Also, unlike
Option 2, the effectiveness of this treatment does not rely on being
able to segregate the impact of the investment from results of the
ongoing business. Project "reviews," which are next to
impossible for most projects underway after several years, will still be
useful for managerial purposes, but accountability for the project will
be built into the overall results for the business.
Drawback
The drawback to
this treatment is the requirement to track and explain the capital
suspense account. Any assets in this account will be accumulating
capital charges on those assets, much like capitalized interest
accumulates on CIP. If SI assets remain in this account for a
pre-specified period, as is usually recommended, then this time must be
tracked and communicated as well.
Various thresholds
or decision rules must be developed to guide managers as to what kind of
investment would be subject to this treatment. Usual guidelines include
a certain percentage of existing capital or a certain projected negative
impact on EP absent any adjustment.
Many times, it is
enough simply to provide an involved procedure for presenting a business
case for such treatment so such proposals can be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis. This works well because such cases take valuable
management time to prepare and managers would be in the best position to
decide what EP-dilutive investments are really worth it. If managers go
to the bother of presenting a case, they will be essentially saying,
this is a project we believe in but may be reluctant to pursue without
some interim relief. Alignment exists between the managers proposing the
investment for special treatment and managers reviewing the project.
They would both want a project approval if everyone believes the project
will create value.